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Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour in England and Wales: An Empirical Evaluation 
of the ASBO’s successor 
 




This article presents the findings of an empirical study conducted with local enforcement 
agents in two areas in England regarding the implementation of the anti-social behaviour 
(ASB) injunction which succeeded the anti-social behaviour order (ASBO). These 
findings shed light on the procedure followed by local enforcement agents when dealing 
with an incident of ASB. The data presented suggests that despite the recent legislative 
amendments, much of the regulation of ASB still takes place in the ‘shadows’ with local 
enforcement agents utilising a range of informal interventions before applying to court 
for the issue of an injunction. Moreover, it is argued that despite the repeal and 
replacement of the ASBO by what appears to be a purely civil measure, many of the 
criticisms raised about the order and its potential misuse remain largely unaddressed. 
 
KEYWORDS 








The introduction of the ASBO in the late 1990s and of the post-conviction ASBO 
(CrASBO) in the early 2000s,1 was presented by the then Labour Government as a direct 
response to ‘the newly identified scourge of ASB’.2 Although some of the kinds of 
behaviour commonly regarded as anti-social were already criminalised,3 the introduction 
of these measures was justified by the alleged inability of the criminal law to deal swiftly 
and effectively with the cumulative effect of low-level criminality.4 This was mainly due 
to the fact that the criminal law paradigmatically focuses on isolated events rather than 
on the cumulative effect of prolonged low-level criminality.5 Other reasons included the 
costs of dealing with this kind of criminality and the barriers posed by the enhanced 
procedural protections, such as the higher standard of proof, afforded to those facing 
criminal prosecution.6 For these reasons, an alternative method of regulation was sought 
that would deal with ASB “effectively” whilst circumventing the abovementioned 
 
* The author would like to thank all of those who participated in the empirical study. The author is also 
grateful to Heather Keating, Colin King, Tanya Palmer, Tarik Kochi, Mark Walters and the two anonymous 
reviewers for their comments and recommendations on an earlier version of this article. 
1 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, section 1 and section 1C respectively. 
2 K Brown, ‘Punitive reform and the cultural life of punishment: Moving from the ASBO to its successors’ 
(2020) 22(1) Punishment & Society 91. 
3 Home Office, More Effective Responses to Anti-Social Behaviour (February 2011) p 5; L Koffman, ‘The 
use of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders: An empirical study of a New Deal for communities area’ (2006) 
Criminal Law Review 605. 
4 H Porter and T Blair, ‘Britain's liberties: The great debate’ (23 April 2006) available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/apr/23/humanrights.constitution; S Macdonald, ‘The 
principle of composite sentencing: Its centrality to, and implications for, the ASBO’ (2006) Criminal Law 
Review 792. 
5 S Macdonald, ‘A suicidal woman, roaming pigs and a noisy trampolinist: Refining the ASBO’s definition 
of “Anti-Social Behaviour”’ (2006) 69 Modern Law Review 185-186; A Ashworth and L Zedner, 
‘Preventive orders: A problem of undercriminalisation?’ in A Duff et al (eds) The Boundaries of the 
Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp 66-67. 
6 S Chakraborti and J Russell, ‘ASBOmania’ in P Squires (ed) ASBONATION: The Criminalisation of 
Nuisance (Bristol: Policy Press, 2008) p 308; A Simester and A von Hirsch, ‘Regulating offensive conduct 
through two-step prohibitions’ in A von Hirsch and A Simester (eds) Incivilities: Regulating Offensive 
Behaviour (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) p 175. 
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obstacles.7 To this end, the ASBO was an amalgamation of civil and criminal processes 
aiming to combine the best of both worlds.8  
Despite the Labour Government’s efforts to encourage the use of the ASBO and 
the CrASBO,9 the ASB regime faced fierce opposition from human rights activists and 
academics and soon fell out of favour.10 The ASBO, for instance, attracted significant 
criticism on the grounds that it was a de facto criminal measure; its expansive definition 
of ASB; and the imposition of custodial sentences following breach of this supposedly 
civil order.11 In response to the criticisms raised about the ASBO and in line with its 
promise for a more victim-oriented approach, the Conservative-Lib Dem Coalition 
Government promised the repeal and replacement of the ASBO by a more flexible and 
effective legal framework.12   
This article begins by offering a critical evaluation of the ASBO’s successor 
introduced under Part 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. 
Although at first sight the repeal and replacement of the ASBO by a purely civil injunction 
appears to be a positive development, the close evaluation of the ASBO’s successor 
reveals that many of the concerns raised about the order and its potential misuse remain 
 
7 Labour Party, A Quiet Life: Tough Action on Criminal Neighbours (1995). 
8 A Simester and A von Hirsch, above n 6, p 175. See also Figure 1. 
9 P Squires, ‘Introduction: Why “anti-social behaviour”? Debating ASBOs’ in P Squires (ed) 
ASBONATION: The Criminalisation of Nuisance (Bristol: Policy Press, 2008) p 5. 
10 K Brown, above n 2, 91; Home Office and Ministry of Justice, ‘Statistical notice: Anti-Social Behaviour 
Order (ASBO) statistics – England and Wales 2013’ (18 September 2014) available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/355103
/anti-social-behaviour-order-statistical-notice-2013.pdf. 
11 A Duff and S Marshall, ‘How Offensive Can You Get?’ in A von Hirsch and A Simester (eds) Incivilities: 
Regulating Offensive Behaviour (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) p 80; A. Ashworth et al, ‘Neighbouring 
on the oppressive: The government's “Anti-Social Behaviour Order” proposals’ (1998) 16 Criminal Justice 
9; E Burney, ‘The ASBO and the shift to punishment’ in P Squires (ed) ASBONATION: The Criminalisation 
of Nuisance (Bristol: Policy Press, 2008) pp 143-145. 
12 Home Office, Putting Victims First: More Effective Responses to Anti- 
Social Behaviour (May 2012) pp 3-4. 
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largely unaddressed.13 The importance of this evaluation is heightened by the fact that the 
injunction appears to be operating in the shadows. This is primarily due to the paucity of 
empirical research on the implementation of the ASBO’s successor and the Government’s 
conscious decision not to collect data about its use, such as the number of successful 
applications made to court. 
The article then proceeds to offer original insights, based on an empirical study in 
two areas of England, on the implementation of the injunction focusing on the procedure 
followed by local enforcement agents when dealing with an incident of ASB.14 Although 
there is a significant body of literature on the ASBO, both at a theoretical15 and an 
empirical level,16 this is the first empirical data collected and presented (that the author is 
aware of) on the implementation of the injunction. The findings presented in this article 
suggest that the 2014 amendments had no substantial impact on the daily management 
and regulation of ASB at a local level. The findings presented also highlight some 
important tensions that lie at the heart of practice, such as the need to prevent further ASB 
while addressing its underlying causes.  
The article concludes by further reflecting on the data collected in both sites and 
identifies mechanisms through which some of the main concerns raised about the 
 
13 This was a concern raised by many human rights campaigners and academics when the Conservative-Lib 
Dem Coalition Government revealed its plans to repeal and replace the ASBO with what was originally 
referred to as the Injunction to Prevent Nuisance and Annoyance. See: Liberty, Liberty’s Briefing on the 
Draft Anti-Social Behaviour Bill (February 2013); K Brown, ‘Replacing the ASBO with the injunction to 
prevent nuisance and annoyance: A plea for legislative scrutiny and amendment’ (2013) 8 Criminal Law 
Review 623.  
14 Local enforcement agents include ASB officers working for the police (including Police Community 
Support Officers), local authorities and housing associations. 
15 See, for example: A Ashworth and L Zedner, above n 5. 
16 See:  A Crawford et al,  ‘“It ain’t (just) what you do, it’s (also) the way that you do it”: The role of 
procedural justice in the implementation of anti-social behaviour interventions with young people’ (2017) 
23 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 9-26; J Donoghue, Anti-Social Behaviour Orders: 
A Culture of Control? (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2010). 
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potential misuse of the injunction can be mitigated against. The importance of this 
analysis lies in the fact that based on the data collected, it is the implementation and the 
procedures in place at a local level that manage to constrain what is an otherwise far-
reaching legal instrument. 
 
1. REFLECTING ON THE 2014 AMENDMENTS 
Although the ASBO was portrayed by the Labour Government as an effective means of 
dealing with ASB,17 the order attracted considerable academic criticism mainly for three 
reasons. First, one of the most contested and heavily criticised aspects of the ASBO was 
ASB’s statutory definition which, according to Ashworth et al, was ‘sweeping and 
vague’.18 Based on the wording of section 1(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, 
any kind of behaviour could be regarded as anti-social as long as it was likely to cause 
‘harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as [the 
perpetrator] himself’.19 The wording adopted afforded a significant magnitude of 
discretion to courts and local enforcement agents to determine the contours of the law, 
with some of its critics noting that this could potentially result in the ‘prohibit[ion of] 
conduct that is otherwise lawful and remains lawful if undertaken by anyone other than 
the defendant’.20 This is due to the fact that section 1(1)(a) of the 1998 Act focused ‘on 
the impact or potential impact of someone’s behaviour on others’ rather than on its 
nature.21  
 
17 See, for example: H Porter and T Blair, above n 4. 
18 A Ashworth et al, above n 11, 9. 
19 See Figure 1. 
20 P Ramsay, ‘What is anti-social behaviour?’ (2004) Criminal Law Review 921. 
21 S Demetriou, ‘From the ASBO to the injunction: A qualitative review of the anti-social behaviour 
legislation post-2014’ (2019) April Public Law 346. 
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Second, another highly opposed feature of the ASBO was its hybrid nature. 
Similar to other civil preventive measures, such as the Football Banning Orders, both the 
ASBO and the CrASBO sought to address the behaviour at hand ‘by restrict[ing] the 
activities of the alleged protagonists by subjecting them to restrictions … supported by 
criminal sanctions when breached’.22 Those who behaved in an anti-social manner could, 
for instance, through the issue of an ASBO, be excluded from a particular area where they 
would usually cause trouble. Although under section 1(10) of the 1998 Act breach of the 
restrictions imposed, without reasonable excuse, constituted a criminal offence, the order 
was civil in nature.23 This meant that some minor ASB accompanied by a breach of the 
restrictions imposed, could result in the imposition of a lengthy custodial sentence.24 The 
CrASBO on the other hand, appeared to be less contentious than the ASBO since it could 
only be issued following a criminal conviction. There was no need however, for the 
triggering offence to be associated with the ASB at hand. In fact, conviction for any 
criminal offence accompanied by evidence of some unrelated and potentially minor ASB, 
could (at least as the law appeared on the statute book) result in the imposition of a 
CrASBO.  
Finally, concerns have been raised about the severity of the restrictions imposed 
on the liberty of those against whom these orders were issued. As Duff and Marshall point 
out, the restrictions imposed when an ASBO was issued could be so severe that they could 
constitute a form of punishment in their own right, albeit ‘not subject to the kind of 
constraint that could legitimise them as punishments’.25 On this view, it was possible for 
 
22 M James and G Pearson, ‘30 years of hurt: The evolution of civil preventive orders, hybrid law, and the 
emergence of the super-football banning order’ (2018) January Public Law 44. 
23 R. (on the application of McCann) v Manchester Crown Court [2002] UKHL 39 para 82. 
24 G Pearson, ‘Hybrid law and human rights – Banning and behaviour orders in the appeal courts’ (2006) 
27 Liverpool Law Review 129-130. 
25 The same argument applied to the CrASBO. See: A Duff and S Marshall, above n 11, p 80. 
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the first limb of this two-part process of regulation to constitute a form of indirect 
criminalisation, i.e. the imposition of criminal punishment through the implementation of 
non-criminal interventions, and therefore the ASBO could operate as a de facto criminal 
measure.26 
At first sight, the repeal and replacement of the ASBO by a purely civil injunction 
can be regarded as a positive development since it mitigates against the concerns raised 
about the ASBO’s hybrid nature.27 The civil nature of the injunction though means that 
its implementation might attract less attention and external scrutiny. This is evidenced by 
the Government’s failure to collect data about the implementation of the injunction. The 
importance of this lack of scrutiny lies in the potential punitive nature of the injunction.28 
Notwithstanding the shift to a purely civil method of regulation, the issue of an injunction 
can result in the imposition of even more burdensome restrictions on the liberty of those 
subjected to it than those that could be imposed through an ASBO. In particular, under 
section 1 of the 1998 Act, a court, through the issue of an ASBO, could impose any 
prohibitions it deemed necessary on the perpetrator in order to prevent them from 
behaving in a similar manner in the future. In contrast, section 1(4) of the 2014 Act 
provides that the issue of an injunction can result in the imposition of both negative and 
positive requirements on the perpetrator.  
The potential severity of the restrictions that can be imposed on the liberty of those 
against whom an injunction is issued becomes even more worrisome in light of the fact 
that the threshold that must be met for the issue of an injunction is lower than the one 
 
26 A Simester and A von Hirsch, above n 6, p 179. 
27 As far as the CrASBO’s successor (i.e. the Criminal Behaviour Order) is concerned, it is worth noting 
that this ‘retain[ed] most of the CrASBO’s key features’. See: S Demetriou, above n 21, 347-348. 
28 K Brown, above n 2, 104. 
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required for the imposition of an ASBO.29 As shown in Figure 1, an ASBO could only be 
issued if the court examining the application was satisfied that the order was ‘necessary 
to protect relevant persons from further anti-social acts’ by the defendant.30 In contrast, a 
court examining an application under section 1(3) of the 2014 Act must only consider ‘it 
just and convenient to grant the injunction for the purpose of preventing the respondent 
from engaging in anti-social behaviour’ something which can raise questions about the 
necessity and proportionality of the requirements imposed. Although the imposition of a 
lower threshold can partly be compensated by the abolition of the ASBO’s minimum 
duration requirement, it still seems possible for the injunction to result in the imposition 









29 As Brown points out, it is ‘debatable’ whether the imposition of this lower threshold will have any 
significant effect for those agencies applying for the issue of an injunction since ‘statistics have shown 
courts granting 98 per cent of ASBO applications’. See: K Brown, above n 13, 623. 
30 Section 1(1)(b) of the 1998 Act. 
31 Whilst ASBOs lasted for a minimum period of two years, under the 2014 Act there is no minimum or 
maximum requirements with regard to the duration of the injunction when the respondent is an adult. In the 
case of a minor, an injunction can last no longer than twelve months. See section 1(3) of the 1998 Act and 
section 1(6) of the 2014 Act respectively. 
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Figure 1: From the ASBO to the injunction 
Applying for the issue of an ASBO 
Triggering behaviour The legal test Requirements Duration Breach 
Behaviour that ‘caused or 
was likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress 
to one or more persons not of 
the same household as [the 
defendant] himself’. 
1. The defendant behaved in an 
anti-social manner; and 
2. The Magistrates’ court had 
to consider the issue of an 
ASBO ‘necessary to protect 
relevant persons from 
further ASB’. 
Through the issue of an 
ASBO, the Magistrates’ 
court could ‘prohibit the 
defendant from doing 
anything described in the 
order’. 
Each ASBO 
lasted for a 
minimum period 
of two years. 
Breach of the requirements 
imposed without reasonable 
excuse constituted a criminal 
offence which carried a 
maximum penalty of five years’ 
imprisonment and a fine. 
Applying for the issue of an injunction 
Triggering behaviour The legal test Requirements Duration Breach 
Conduct that: 
1. ‘caused or is likely 
to cause 
harassment, alarm 
or distress to any 
person’; 
2. is ‘capable of 
causing nuisance or 
annoyance’ in a 
housing-related 
context; or 
3. is ‘capable of 
causing nuisance or 
annoyance’ to 
anyone. 
1. The respondent behaved in 
an anti-social manner; and 
2. The court ‘considers it just 
and convenient to grant the 
injunction for the purpose of 
preventing the respondent 
from engaging in ASB’. 
Through the issue of an 
injunction, the court can 
prohibit the respondent 
from and/or require the 
respondent to do anything 
described in the injunction. 
For adults there 
are no minimum 
or maximum 
requirements. 
For those under 
the age of 18, the 
injunction can 
last for a period of 
no more than 
twelve months. 
For adults, breach of the 
injunction without reasonable 
excuse constitutes a civil 
contempt of court which carries 
a maximum penalty of two 
years’ imprisonment and an 
unlimited fine. 
For those under the age of 18, 
breach of the injunction without 
reasonable excuse constitutes a 
civil contempt of court and can 
result in a detention order (only 
for those between 14 and 17 
years) or a supervision order 




Moreover, although breach of the injunction does not constitute a criminal 
offence, those found in breach of the requirements imposed on them face a maximum 
sentence of two years’ imprisonment and an unlimited fine.32 Hence, although the hybrid 
model adopted by the ASBO was abandoned, serious concerns can still be raised about 
the potential (punitive) ramifications that breach of this supposedly civil measure can 
have. 
There is also evidence to suggest that the ‘ASBOs represent[ed] only the very tip 
of a much larger structure of proactive ASB interventions’.33 Evidence suggests that 
sometimes young people were forced to sign an acceptable behaviour contract (ABC)34 
out of fear of losing their accommodation something that highlights the potential punitive 
nature of these informal interventions.35  
Allowing the state to criminalise behaviour indirectly through non-criminal 
interventions is morally problematic since it is possible for law enforcement agents to 
expand (even unwittingly) the reach of criminal punishment into areas that had been 
concluded by the legislature as not appropriate for criminalisation. This becomes more 
problematic in light of the fact that those subjected to indirect criminalisation are denied, 
at least to some extent, all of those enhanced procedural protections afforded to those 
 
32 For those between the age of 14 and 17, breach of the injunction issued against them is dealt with in the 
youth court and can result in the imposition of a detention order. See: Home Office, Anti-Social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act 2014: Reform of Anti-Social Behaviour Powers – Statutory Guidance for Frontline 
Professionals (August 2019) p 26. 
33 A Crawford et al, above n 16, 12. 
34 ABCs are informal agreements/contracts signed between local enforcement agents and perpetrators as a 
means of nipping ‘the problem behaviour in the bud before it escalates’. As part of these informal contracts, 
perpetrators might agree to refrain from doing certain things, such as visiting certain parts of the town, 
and/or engage with certain service providers, such as to attend drug-rehabilitation treatment. Although 
‘there are no formal sanctions associated with breaching’ an agreement of this kind, this can clearly be used 
as evidence in court in order to obtain an injunction against the perpetrator. See: Home Office, above n 32, 
pp 18-19. 
35 A Crawford et al, above n 16, 19. 
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facing criminal prosecution.36 In order to prevent this from happening, the European 
Court of Human Rights formulated the anti-subversion doctrine which supposedly 
enables courts to look beyond the label attached to each legal instrument by the legislature 
and scrutinise the true nature of the penalty imposed on the perpetrator.37 If, following 
the application of the anti-subversion doctrine, the court believes that the sanction 
imposed is criminal in nature, i.e. it constitutes a form of punishment, then the legal 
instrument at hand should be regarded as a ‘criminal charge’ and those against whom it 
is used should be afforded the same procedural and evidential protections as those facing 
criminal prosecution.38  
As far as ASB’s statutory definition is concerned, it is worth mentioning that the 
ambit of the injunction extends well beyond that of the ASBO. The ASBO only dealt with 
behaviour that ‘caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to … persons 
not of the same household’ as the perpetrator himself.39 The injunction on the other hand, 
does not only deal with behaviour that ‘caused or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or 
distress to any person’, but it also covers conduct that is capable of ‘causing nuisance or 
annoyance’.40 Consequently, through the 2014 amendments, the Conservative-Lib Dem 
Coalition Government did not only fail to address the concerns raised about the subjective 
nature of ASB’s statutory definition, but it extended the reach of the law even further.41  
 
36 A Simester and A von Hirsch, above n 6, p 175. 
37 Engel v Netherlands (1979-1980) 1 E.H.R.R. 647 para 81-82. 
38 For a critique of the anti-subversion doctrine see: L Zedner, ‘Penal subversions: When is a punishment 
not punishment, who decides and on what grounds?’ (2016) 20(1) Theoretical Criminology 3-20. 
39 Section 1 of the 1998 Act. 
40 Section 2(1) of the 2014 Act. 
41 This can be partly attributed to the fact that this new injunction was the result of the consolidation of a 
number of tools and powers into a ‘single multi-purpose’ instrument. See: House of Commons, Anti-social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014: Explanatory Motes (October 2013) para 13; S Demetriou, above 
n 21, 347. 
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It is evident from the above analysis of the injunction that although the 2014 Act 
was a great opportunity for the then government to address some of the many concerns 
raised about the ASBO, these remained largely unaddressed (at least as the law appears 
on the statute book). The failure of the 2014 Act to adequately address the 
abovementioned concerns along with the potential absence of outside scrutiny regarding 
the use of the injunction, necessitates a close examination of how the ASBO’s successor 
has been implemented at a local level.  
 
2. ADDRESSING ASB AT A LOCAL LEVEL 
In this second part of the article a qualitative analysis of the injunction will be provided. 
The data presented below was collated as part of a two-year empirical study conducted 
with local enforcement agents in two counties in England focusing on the impact of the 
2014 amendments on the daily regulation of ASB. The data was collected between May 
2015 and April 2016.  
The identification of potential sites was based on the data published through the 
Crime Survey for England and Wales.42 The study focused on one area with high levels 
of ASB, i.e. Site A, and on one with significantly lower levels of ASB, i.e. Site B. As part 
of this study, twenty-nine semi-structured interviews were conducted across both sites. In 
Site A, nineteen semi-structured interviews were conducted, ten with local practitioners, 
i.e. ASB officers working for local authorities and housing associations, and nine with 
police officers.43 In Site B, ten interviews were conducted, six with local practitioners and 
 
42 Office for National Statistics, Experiences of Anti-social Behaviour by Police Force Area, English 
Regions and Wales, Year Ending December 2013 CSEW (July 2014). 
43 A three-part unique reference code was allocated to each research participant. The first part of this unique 
code represents a randomly allocated number to each interviewee. The second part reflects the interviewee’s 
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four with police officers.44 The study focused only on local enforcement agents who had 
a daily interaction with ASB and were responsible for the implementation of the 
injunction.  
The data collected through these interviews were later analysed thematically.. The 
findings of this study are presented in four subsections. The first subsection focuses on 
the procedure followed by local enforcement agents when notified about a potential 
incident of ASB. 45 Central to the procedure followed in both sites is the level of risk 
posed by the perpetrator to the alleged victim and how this can be best managed and 
addressed. It is also worth noting that ‘risk’ had major implications not just in terms of 
the procedure followed before applying for the issue of an injunction, but throughout the 
whole process.  The second set of data presented focuses on the various interventions 
utilised by local enforcement agents as a means of dealing with the perpetrator’s 
behaviour. The findings of this study clearly suggest that the regulation of ASB takes 
primarily place in the shadows since local enforcement agents try to use a range of 
informal interventions before applying to court for the issue of an injunction. The paper 
next presents data on the requirements that local enforcement agents seek to impose on 
those against whom an application is made in court for the issue of an injunction. 
Although many research participants acknowledged how impactful these requirements 
can be on the liberty of the perpetrators, most of them firmly believed that they would 
only seek to obtain those requirements that are necessary and proportionate to the risk 
 
occupational background, i.e. ‘LP’ for local practitioners and ‘PO’ for police officers (including Police 
Community Support Officers). The final part of this unique identification code refers to the site where the 
research participant was working at the time the interview was conducted.  
44 Although fewer interviews were conducted in Site B, it is important to note that data saturation was 
achieved. 
45 The data presented in this paper does not cover the procedure followed by local enforcement agents after 
an injunction was breached. 
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posed. The final set of data focuses on whether the injunction was used as a means of 
publically and purposefully condemning the perpetrators. Although the publication of 
certain information about perpetrators and their conduct was not deemed by many 
participants to be inappropriate per se, there was a general consensus that information 
should only be shared with those directly affected by the ASB at hand.     
 
(a) Procedure followed  
Based on the data collected, it was evident that in both sites the administration of ASB 
was primarily risk-driven. When local enforcement agencies were notified about a 
potential incident of ASB, a risk assessment was carried out to assess the level of risk 
faced by the victim. This risk assessment comprised of ‘a series of questions which would 
be asked to the victims of ASB to identify what risk level they are at: being standard, 
medium or high’ (Int.12/PO/Site B).  
What was clear from the evidence collected in both areas was that the level of risk 
faced by the victim informed the entire procedure followed by local enforcement agents, 
and not just the initial stage of their investigation. According to one police officer, the 
level of risk faced by the victim ‘will [be] monitored until we have reduced that risk right 
down to a level where we can say actually “we have solved this problem. The person is 
no longer at risk”’ (Int.18/PO/Site A). As far as high-risk cases are concerned, evidence 
collected from both areas suggests that these cases were regarded as a top priority and 
were discussed at the local community safety partnership multi-agency meetings. As one 
police officer noted, ‘once a week we will meet with the local authority and we will 
15 
 
basically discuss all of our high-risk cases and just check that we are doing everything 
that we can in a timely manner and that we have not missed anything’ (Int.12/PO/Site B). 
The role and importance attributed to the risk posed to victims was an unsurprising 
discovery mainly due to the prevalence of risk assessments in the development of crime 
policies since the late 20th century46 which led to what Feeley and Simon describe as the 
evolution of ‘new penology’.47 Central to new penology is the ‘retrospective orientation 
of the criminal justice process’.48 As Garland explains, perpetrators are increasingly ‘seen 
as risks that must be managed rather than rehabilitated’.49 As a result of this, particular 
attention is paid by various criminal justice institutions, such as the police, to the level of 
risk posed by certain individuals rather than focusing exclusively on the nature of the 
wrong committed. In many jurisdictions,50 risk calculating tools were incorporated in 
sentencing policies as a means of identifying and managing ‘those offenders who pose a 
real and present risk of harm to others’.51 In similar fashion, in England and Wales, the 
ambit of the criminal law, especially with regard to terrorism-related activities, has been 
 
46 P O’Malley, ‘Crime and Risk’ in P Carlen and A Leandro (eds) Alternative Criminologies (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2017) p 223; D Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary 
Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001) p 12. 
47 M Feeley and J Simon, ‘The new penology: Notes on the emerging strategy of corrections and its 
implications’ (1992) 30 Criminology 449. 
48 L Zedner, Security (Oxon: Routledge, 2007) pp 1-2. 
49 D Garland, above n 46, p 175. 
50 As far as England and Wales is concerned, risk assessment tools and multi-agency collaborations were 
first established as a means of dealing with domestic violence. As explained by Hoyle, the use of risk 
assessment tools can assist the various criminal justice agencies to identify ‘those at risk of victimisation’ 
at an early stage and therefore prevent domestic violence. This is mainly due to the fact that the relevant 
agencies rely on ‘[s]tructured decision approaches, using risk indices, [that] are superior to unstructured 
approaches because they promise broader and more accurate coverage of issues in assessing risk’. See: C 
Hoyle, ‘Will she be safe? A critical analysis of risk assessment in domestic violence cases’ (2008) 30(3) 
Children and Youth Services Review 328-329. 
51 M Ansbro, ‘The nuts and bolts of risk assessment: When the clinical and actuarial conflict’ (2010) 49(3) 
The Howard League 252; K Hannah-Moffat, ‘Punishment and risk’ in J Simon and R Sparks (eds) The 
Sage Handbook of Punishment and Society (London: Sage, 2013) p 2. 
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extended well beyond traditional inchoate liability to criminal offences ‘targeted at non-
imminent crimes’.52  
The use of risk assessment tools to calculate the level of risk posed by those who 
behave in an anti-social manner appears to be a sensible approach since these tools usually 
operate on ‘a standard set of criteria on which to base decisions of risk’ and therefore 
eliminate any elements of subjectivity.53 This enables local enforcement agents to 
calculate more accurately the level of risk faced by those affected by the perpetrator’s 
behaviour. Nevertheless, the outcome of these assessments should be approached with 
caution, especially when dealing with ASB, for a number of reasons. First, the increased 
reliance on risk assessments in the 1990s played a pivotal role in the establishment of a 
‘culture of control’ the main focus of which is how potential risks can be identified and 
excluded rather than reformed.54 This shift from welfarism to crime management 
highlights an important tension faced by contemporary liberal societies which need not 
only to reassure the public that potential risks are promptly identified and addressed, but 
they also need to deal with the underlying causes of criminality.  
Second, it is worth reiterating here that in contrast to the pre-2014 era, there is no 
need for the court examining an application under Part 1 of the 2014 Act to consider the 
issue of an injunction (and therefore the imposition of certain restrictions on the liberty 
of the perpetrator) as a necessary means for the prevention of further ASB.55 Instead, the 
court only needs to be satisfied that the issue of the injunction is a ‘just and convenient’ 
 
52 J McCulloch and D Wilson, Pre-crime: Pre-emption, Precaution and the Future (Oxon: Routledge, 2016) 
pp 5-6. 
53 J McCafferty, ‘Professional discretion and the predictive validity of a juvenile risk assessment instrument: 
Exploring the overlooked principle of effective correctional classification’ (2017) 15(2) Youth Violence 
and Juvenile Justice 103-104. 
54 P O’Malley, above n 46, ch 1. 
55 See ‘Reflecting on the 2014 amendments’. 
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response for the prevention of further ASB.56 This lower threshold in conjunction with an 
extensive reliance on risk assessments can result in the imposition of significant and 
potentially disproportionate (bearing in mind what the perpetrator has actually done 
rather than what they might do in the future) restrictions on the liberty of those who are 
thought to pose a risk to others.    
Moreover, although a risk-based approach can be beneficial in terms of 
identifying potential wrongdoers, as O’Malley points out, this is also likely to create new 
risks, such as the social ostracisation of the potential wrongdoer.57 Finally (and most 
importantly), a risk-based approach can result in the expansion of the net of social control. 
As pointed out by Ansbro, when assessing the level of risk posed by someone, 
‘practitioners feel an understandable pressure to err on the side of caution’ and they might 
therefore decide to use the injunction pre-emptively despite the perpetrator not actually 
causing harassment, alarm or distress.58 As mentioned above, this cannot only lead to the 
inconsistent implementation of the law, but it can also result in the imposition of 
disproportionate and potentially punitive restrictions on the liberty of those who are 
deemed to pose a risk to others.  
As far as the sites under study are concerned, there was no evidence to suggest 
that the adoption of this risk-driven approach resulted in the pre-emptive and/or 
unjustifiable use of the relevant tools and powers.59 In fact, many of the abovementioned 
 
56 Section 1(3) of the 2014 Act. 
57 P O’Malley, above n 46, ch 1. 
58 M Ansbro, above n 51, 259. 
59 It should be noted though that this study examined the implementation of the injunction from a 
practitioner’s perspective. Those against whom an injunction was imposed might in fact feel that their 
behaviour did not cause any of the negative experiences that fall within the ambit of Part 1 of the 2014 Act 
and that therefore the injunction was used pre-emptively.  
18 
 
concerns raised regarding the use of risk assessment tools were partly mitigated by the 
adoption of a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary approach.60  
Before illustrating how the adoption of this multi-agency and multi-disciplinary 
approach mitigated some of the concerns raised by the use of risk assessment tools, it will 
be instructive to elaborate further on the collaboration between the various enforcement 
agencies dealing with ASB at a local level. The next testimony is illustrative of this close 
collaboration among the various enforcement agencies in both sites:  
We must make sure that other agencies are aware of that person … so it is 
really the case that a lot more agencies are involved now. Obviously in the 
past it was unstructured … with this new computer system we can put 
entries into the system which the council can read instantly (Int.15/PO/Site 
A). 
To emphasise the importance of these information-sharing agreements, one of the 
interviewees made reference to the case of Fiona Pilkington: ‘we all knew a little bit about 
it and this is where the sharing of information comes in. Each individual person had bits 
and pieces but it was never joined up and brought together’ (Int.18/PO/Site A).61 
What is of particular importance for the purposes of this article is that high-risk 
cases were examined from various perspectives and a collective decision was taken as to 
the best way forward. The importance of this strategy lies in the very nature of ASB which 
on some occasions requires a multi-agency approach. This can be attributed to the fact 
 
60 There is also evidence to suggest that on many occasions local enforcement agents take into consideration 
various factors when determining whether someone’s behaviour should be regarded as anti-social, many of 
which tend to narrow the scope of the law. See: S Demetriou, above n 21, 351-356. 
61 For more on the case of Fiona Pilkington see: Independent Police Complaints Commission, IPCC Report 
into the Contact between Fiona Pilkington and Leicester Constabulary 2004 – 2007 (2009). 
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that some people behave in an anti-social manner not simply by choice, but due to a 
number of deep-seated social problems that require careful attention.62 Consequently, in 
order for local enforcement agents to be able to permanently address the perpetrator’s 
behaviour due attention and consideration must be paid to its underlying causes. To this 
end, local enforcement agents need to consult with other relevant institutions, such as the 
local mental health team, which might be in a better position to deal with the causes of 
the ASB. This close collaboration with other agencies clearly enables local enforcement 
agents to assess more accurately both the needs and the risk posed by each perpetrator.  
Moreover, the adoption of this multi-agency and multi-disciplinary approach did not only 
add an extra layer of review in the whole process, but it was also instrumental in the 
adoption of a less enforcement-led stance towards ASB. The following narrative does not 
only explain how police attitudes towards homeless people changed following their 
collaboration with local practitioners who had a social care background and more 
experience in dealing with this group of people, but also illustrates how the adoption of 
this multi-disciplinary approach mitigated against some of the abovementioned concerns 
about the use of risk assessment tools:  
The police had a very negative attitude to them … we had to work together 
for two weeks solid and they had a no arrest policy and we got them to take 
off their hats, they still had uniform, to start breaking down those barriers 
which we found very difficult (Int.3/LP/Site A). 
The above statement does not only demonstrate how the occupational background of local 
enforcement agents can influence their approach to ASB, but it also highlights the impact 
 
62 Home Office, above n 32, p 23. 
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that this might have on other enforcement agents.63 Hence, despite the potential adverse 
effects that a risk-driven approach can have on the regulation of ASB, these were 
compensated (at least to some extent) by the adoption of a multi-agency and multi-
disciplinary approach in both sites. 
Moreover, it was evident from the data collected from both sites that there was an 
effective ‘responsibilisation strategy’ in place.64 As Garland explains, the 
‘responsibilisation strategy’ refers to the process of connecting ‘state agencies … with 
practices of actors in the “private sector” and “the community”’ in order to delegate the 
responsibility of crime management and prevention.65  As far as the sites under study are 
concerned, there was evidence to suggest that housing providers and the public were 
asked to take an active role in the policing of injunctions. Similarly, perpetrators were 
often asked, through the imposition of positive requirements, to address the underlying 
causes of their behaviour. 
The delegation of responsibility to non-state actors and the public regarding crime 
management is not a new phenomenon.66 Instead, it is a well-stablished form of 
governance through which society is regulated indirectly.67  For O’Malley and Palmer a 
possible explanation for the rise of this form of social control is that ‘good governance 
came to be identified with dependency on expertise, as the locus of objective knowledge 
 
63 See also K Brown, ‘The developing habitus of the anti-social behaviour practitioner: From expansion in 
years of plenty to surviving the age of austerity’ (2013) 40(3) Journal of Law and Society 398. 
64 D Garland, above n 46, p 124. 
65 Ibid, p 124. 
66 J Flint, ‘Social housing agencies and the governance of anti-social behaviour’ (2002) 17(4) Housing 
Studies 622; A Crawford, ‘Governing through anti-social behaviour’ (2009) 49 British Journal of 
Criminology 822. 
67 G Mythen, Understanding the Risk Society (Hampshire: Macmillan, 2014) pp 53-54; K Bullock and N 
Fielding, ‘Community crime prevention’ in N Tilley and A Sidebottom (eds) Handbook of Crime 
Prevention and Community Safety (Oxon: Routledge, 2017) p 89. 
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required for scientific and professional management of the social’.68 The importance of 
this need to rely on expertise is even more apparent in the context of ASB the regulation 
of which involves ‘a diverse range of work [that] requires a comprehensive knowledge 
and skill set’.69 As one police officer explained:  
We will always look at a sort of multi-agency approach. If there are other 
agencies that can be involved in order to get them the kind of support they 
need in order to prevent them from committing further offences, we will ask 
them to get involved (Int.27/PO/Site A).  
As the following testimony demonstrates, this shift of responsibility can also be attributed 
to the limited resources available to local enforcement agencies: ‘there are not enough 
police officers as they used to be to deal with this and in theory you have partners who 
are trying to deal with it as well’ (Int.8/LP/Site B). 
Overall, evidence from both sites suggests that the majority of the participants 
strongly believed that a multi-agency approach was the best way forward, both in terms 
of information-sharing and the administration of high-risk cases. This well-established 
multi-agency approach in both sites contrasts the findings of previous studies according 
to which there was ‘a lack of joined-up approaches within and between partners’70 and 
‘inconsistent attitudes towards information sharing’.71 Some possible explanations for 
this include the limited availability of resources and the realisation by local enforcement 
 
68 P O’Malley and D Palmer, ‘Post-Keynesian policing’ (1996) 25(2) Economy and Society 140.  
69 K Brown, above n 63, 388-389. 
70 A Crawford et al, above n 16, 15. 
71 J Donoghue, above n 16, pp 99-100. 
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agents that on many occasions ASB is the precursor to a number of other issues that need 
to be addressed.72  
Regardless of the true causes and alleged efficacy of this responsibilisation 
strategy, attention should be paid to its potential adverse consequences as well. For 
instance, an extensive responsibilisation strategy cannot only transform dramatically the 
criminal justice system, but it can also have a profound effect on the relationship between 
the State and the public.73 The risk is that the State no longer assumes responsibility for 
the (mis)management of crime and ASB and instead accountability for failing crime 
prevention strategies can be shifted to non-state actors.74 The result is that state agencies 
escape accountability for such matters and government institutions deflect blame that 
might otherwise be appointed by the public. Although therefore the adoption of a multi-
agency and multi-disciplinary approach towards ASB is not a panacea, it can at least 
mitigate against some of the abovementioned concerns raised about the potential misuse 
of the relevant tools and powers, such as the regulation of purely innocent kinds of 
behaviour. 
 
(b) Applying for the issue of an injunction 
Evidence from previous studies suggests that applying to court for the issue of an ASBO 
was not, in general, a first resort measure for local enforcement agents.75 Instead, 
according to Lewis et al, the measures used to address ASB ‘form[ed] a pyramidal system 
 
72 S Demetriou, above n 21, 355. 
73 D Garland, ‘The limits of the sovereign state’ (1996) 36(4) British Journal of Criminology 454. 
74 K Bullock and N Fielding, above n 67, p 90. 
75 L Koffman, above n 3, 601. 
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of regulation’ with the ASBO being located at its apex.76 Based on this system, those 
whose behaviour was deemed as anti-social would initially receive a warning letter urging 
them to alter their behaviour. Failure to comply with this warning letter would result in 
the issue of an ABC. The final stage would include an application for the issue of an 
ASBO.77 Based on their findings, although the existence of this ‘pyramidal system’ was 
confirmed, in practice Lewis et al found that there were ‘myriad variations’ amongst the 
sites under investigation with some of them adding extra layers of regulation.78 
This pyramidal system of social control is closely associated with Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s model of responsive regulation.79 Responsive regulation starts from the 
premise that it is more likely for the regulator to ‘convince’ the regulatee to comply, in 
this case stop behaving in an anti-social manner, if a pyramidal system of regulation is in 
place.80 The rationale for this system is for the regulator to ‘escalate to somewhat punitive 
approaches only reluctantly and only when dialogue fails. Then escalate to even more 
punitive approaches only when more modest sanctions fail’.81 As Braithwaite maintains, 
if less punitive/coercive responses have been used first, then the regulation will be ‘seen 
as more legitimate and procedurally fair [and therefore] compliance with the law is more 
likely’.82 
Despite the different levels of ASB experienced, evidence collected by this 
present study confirms the existence of a ‘pyramidal system of regulation’ in both sites, 
 
76 S Lewis et al, ‘Nipping crime in the bud? The use of anti-social behaviour interventions with young 
people in England and Wales’ (2017) 57 British Journal of Criminology 1238.  
77 Ibid, 1238-1239. 
78 Ibid, 1238. 
79 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992) pp 4-7. 
80 Ibid, ch 2. 
81 J Braithwaite, ‘The essence of responsive regulation’ (2011) 44 University of British Columbia Law 
Review 482. 
82 Ibid, 486. 
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with the injunction located at its apex. In both sites, there was a genuine belief that 
applying to court for the issue of an injunction should generally be reserved as a last 
resort measure. As one local practitioner explained, ‘taking it to court, for me personally 
is failure on what we can do otherwise to remove the ASB’ (Int.10/LP/Site B). 
 
Figure 2: The standard process of regulation followed in both sites 
 
 
Figure 2 is illustrative of the procedure followed by local enforcement agents in 
both sites with regard to the management of ASB. Initially, a risk assessment will be 
conducted in order to assess the level of risk posed by the alleged perpetrator. The next 
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this does not work, then a warning letter will be issued against the perpetrator explaining 
the potential consequences of non-compliance. There was strong evidence to suggest that 
in both sites local enforcement agents would then examine the possibility of utilising 
certain restorative justice (RJ) processes with the majority of them noting that the most 
commonly used process was victim-offender mediation. As one interviewee from Site A 
noted:  
We are trying to move … to a more restorative type of language and 
approach … [if] somebody has come to our attention for the first time and 
they are willing to engage we will try and look at restorative options. Will 
they be willing to write a letter of apology? Will they be willing to meet 
and have like a community conference (Int.4/LP/Site A)? 
A similar approach was also adopted in Site B. As one interviewee pointed out ‘we are 
using more of the RJ side of things … a lot of us have received RJ training and we are 
trying to get the local communities to solve the problem’ (Int.8/LP/Site B).  
The importance of the adoption of a more RJ approach should not be 
underestimated. The use of victim-offender or community mediation in the context of 
hate crimes, for example, has been very successful in ‘reducing [victims’] emotional harm 
and preventing further hate incidents from recurring’.83 This was also confirmed by one 
local practitioner who argued that their ‘best success rate is around mediation’ 
(Int.9/LP/Site B).  The availability of RJ processes also adds an extra and less coercive 
layer in the pyramidal system of regulation used in both sites. Consequently, those who 
behave in an anti-social manner are provided with more opportunities to comply before 
 
83 M Walters, Hate Crime and Restorative Justice: Exploring Causes, Repairing Harms (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014) p 239. 
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local enforcement agents apply for the issue of an injunction.84  It should be borne in mind 
though that the use of RJ processes is contingent upon the willingness of both the 
perpetrator and those affected by their behaviour to participate. 
Evidence from both sites also suggests that when the level of risk posed by that 
person was high, then the perpetrator would move through (or even skip some of) the 
above steps very quickly. One interviewee noted that ‘if there is physical violence or if 
there is a hate element it will be much more likely to go to court and speed it up’ 
(Int.5/LP/Site A). This replicates the findings of previous studies which demonstrate that 
the use of formal legal action was neither a first nor a last resort measure.85 Instead, this 
was done ‘on a case by case basis … depending on the specific facts of the incidents 
reported’ (Int.3/LP/Site B).   
Despite the move towards a purely civil injunction, it was evident from the data 
collected that in both sites the regulation of ASB takes place in the ‘shadows’ with local 
enforcement agents utilising an array of informal interventions before an application is 
submitted to the court for the issue of an injunction. Notwithstanding the potential 
benefits of responsive regulation, i.e. seeking to achieve compliance through less punitive 
interventions before resorting to formal (and potentially more punitive) legal action, it is 
apparent that robust review procedures must be put in place in order to ensure that these 
informal interventions are not operating as de facto criminal measures. 
 
(c) Requirements imposed 
 
84 Of course, further research on the use of RJ for ASB and its impact on procedural and distributive justice 
of such cases is needed. 
85 L Koffman, above n 3, 601; S Lewis et al, above n 76, 1238-1239. 
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The presence of the aforementioned system of regulation appears to provide perpetrators 
with ample opportunity to alter their behaviour and demonstrates that applying to court 
for the issue of an injunction is usually reserved as a last resort measure.  It should be 
borne in mind though that the pinnacle of the pyramid is enforcement which can still 
result in the indirect criminalisation of certain kinds of ASB. Hence, despite the presence 
of this pyramid, it is still imperative to scrutinise the ramifications that enforcement can 
have on those who reach the apex of this system.   
As expected and in line with the findings of a previous study, according to many 
participants, the most common types of restrictions imposed on those against whom these 
measures were used included: ‘(i) people being prohibited from doing certain things; (ii) 
going to certain places; (iii) being with certain people; and (iv) being out and about in 
certain times’ (Int.2/LP/Site A).86 As acknowledged by one interviewee, congregating 
with certain individuals, entering into specific parts of town or feeding pigeons ‘appear 
to the surface to be everyday lawful activities’ (Int.4/LP/Site A).  
Most of the participants also made particular reference to the imposition of 
positive obligations and their potential benefits. Some of the most commonly cited 
examples included: (i) attending drug or alcohol related treatments; and (ii) engaging with 
the ‘mental health services’ (Int.8/LP/Site B). The importance of this, according to many 
of the participants, lies with the fact that if ‘someone is addicted to drugs and you just tell 
them to stop, then they will not stop’ behaving in an anti-social manner (Int.16/LP/Site 
B). For this reason, local enforcement agents tried to utilise positive requirements in an 
attempt to address the underlying causes of ASB (Int.8/LP/Site B). As the following 
 
86 R Matthews et al, Assessing the Use and Impact of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (Bristol: Policy Press, 
2007) p 35. 
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testimony illustrates, if the perpetrator refused to utilise the services provided to them, 
then local enforcement agents could apply for the issue of an injunction as a means of 
forcing the perpetrator to engage with the relevant service provider: ‘For me is about 
using enforcement as a tool to get people to engage in social care and make significant 
sustainable changes in their life style. That is the only way it will sit comfortably with 
me’ (Int.3/LP/Site A). As another local practitioner noted, obtaining an injunction is not 
a panacea for addressing the underlying causes of ASB: ‘if we know that someone would 
never stick to anything, then we would never want to set up someone to fail’ 
(Int.20/LP/Site A). Rather, based on their account these measures should only be used if 
there is a realistic prospect of success. 
The use of the injunction on purely paternalistic grounds can be criticised for 
denying perpetrators the opportunity to reject treatment. Rather than treating the 
perpetrator as a rational agent who is capable of deciding whether (and how) he should 
address the underlying causes of his behaviour, local enforcement agents seek through 
formal interventions (approved by courts) to dictate what they regard as the most 
appropriate treatment.87 That said, this finding should be examined in light of the multi-
agency and multi-disciplinary approach adopted in both sites which enabled local 
enforcement agents to examine high-risk ASB from various perspectives. Participants to 
these multi-agency meetings had different skills, backgrounds and experience all of which 
were brought together in order to reach to a collective decision as to the best way forward. 
Moreover, the importance attributed to the underlying causes of ASB demonstrates that 
 
87 For a comprehensive analysis of the normative challenges posed by paternalistic interventions see: D 
Husak, ‘Paternalism’ in A Marmor (ed) The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (New York: 
Routledge, 2012).   
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even when someone reaches the apex of this pyramidal system, they are still provided 
with an opportunity to change their behaviour.   
Although many of the participants acknowledged that some of the requirements 
imposed interfered with the perpetrator’s liberty, for most of them this interference was 
warranted because their objective was to ‘prevent them from conducting behaviour which 
is not acceptable’ (Int.19/PO/Site A). As one police officer noted:  
If somebody has not stepped over the line, they will be allowed to carry 
on doing what they were doing. If they have stepped over the line … 
then yes it would stop them doing something that might be legitimate to 
them, such as walking down the high street (Int.14/PO/Site B). 
To support the justifiability of these restrictions, most of the participants emphasised the 
need for these to be both necessary and proportionate:  
We always say ‘Is it necessary to ask for that restriction?’ and ‘Is it 
proportionate to ask for that restriction?’ ... If we do not feel that we 
have the evidence to support and say ‘yes’ to both of these questions, 
then we would not have included them. (Int.4/LP/Site A). 
Although local enforcement agents firmly believed that the requirements imposed were 
necessary and proportionate to the risk posed by the perpetrators, prohibiting someone 
from engaging in otherwise lawful activities can be criticised for creating personalised 
prohibitions which only apply to certain individuals rather to the entire society. This 
clearly raises serious concerns about the actual (if there are any) limits of the ASB legal 
framework in terms of the restrictions that can be imposed on the liberty of those whose 
behaviour is regarded as anti-social, albeit this shift to what appears to be a purely civil 
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injunction. Moreover, it highlights the potential for these measures to be implemented 
inconsistently across England and Wales. The adoption of the abovementioned pyramidal 
system though can contribute to the consistent implementation of the law, while the 
adoption of a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary approach can act as a safety net against 
the misuse of these measures.  
 
(d) As a means of communicating censure? 
The implementation of the ASBO was heavily criticised due to the ‘naming and shaming’ 
practices used by many local enforcement agencies in previous years,88 which contributed 
significantly to the demonization and social ostracisation of certain social groups, such as 
young people.89  Nonetheless, in R. (on the application of Stanley) v Commissioner of 
Police of the Metropolis the publication of the ASBO recipients’ personal details along 
with the restrictions imposed on them was deemed compatible with the provisions of 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, i.e. right to private and family 
life, with the court noting that the publication of this kind of information was essential 
for the effective enforcement of the ASBOs.90  
A similar approach with regard to the publication of information about those who 
behave in an anti-social manner, is adopted under the 2014 Act, with the Statutory 
Guidance emphasising the need to reassure victims and local ‘communities that action is 
being taken’.91 Although the publication of certain information can be necessary for the 
effective enforcement of the requirements imposed, it was evident in some cases, such as 
 
88 K Brown, above n 2, 96. 
89 P Squires and D Stephen, ‘Rethinking ASBOs’ (2005) 25 Critical Social Policy 523. 
90 [2004] EWHC 2229 para 40-42. 
91 Home Office, above n 32, p 31. 
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in Stanley where colourful language was used against the perpetrators, that this could also 
be used as a means of publically condemning the ASBO recipients. This led many legal 
commentators, such as Duff and Marshall and Brown, to label the ASBO as a de facto 
punitive measure.92  
In Site A, most of the participants stated that they would publicise information 
about the perpetrator and the restrictions imposed on them only to those affected by their 
behaviour in order to facilitate the effective policing of the measures put in place 
(Int.19/PO/Site A). As one local practitioner explained, ‘you have to be very 
proportionate as to how you ensure that people are aware of the order … if a person is 
banned from going to Co-op you do not need to inform the national press about it?’ 
(Int.16/LP/Site A).  
Moreover, what was clear from the evidence collected is that for the majority of 
the participants it was important to ensure that ‘each case [was] dealt with on its own 
merits’ (Int.21/PO/Site A). The following account provided by one local practitioner is 
representative of most of the testimonies given in Site A:  
Every case needs to be risk-assessed … there will be a multi-agency risk 
assessment that will need to take place. What are the risks to the individual 
if the public finds out about what they have done? You look at age. You 
look at personal circumstances. (Int.9/LP/Site A). 
The need to take into account the potential impact that the publication of certain 
information might have on the perpetrator was emphasised by many participants, 
especially in cases involving young people. As one local practitioner mentioned, 
 
92 A Duff and S Marshall, above n 11, p 80; K Brown, above n 2, 104. 
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publicising information about a young individual can be counterproductive because it is 
likely to ‘increase the fear of harm and the negative views about young people’ 
(Int.2/LP/Site A).  
Nonetheless, many interviewees noted that under certain circumstances 
information should be shared more widely. They noted that this would only happen in 
cases where the ‘victim is at real risk and any further ASB by the perpetrator … can make 
them really suffer’ (Int.29/PO/Site A). For three out of the nineteen participants from Site 
A, however, it appeared that ‘the norm is that if you are dealing with an adult, then you 
are going to inform the public’ (Int.23/PO/Site A). One police officer noted the following: 
‘I think it is not necessarily a bad thing. I think that other people from the wider society 
have a right to know if somebody has breached the law in a sense and has certain 
conditions in order to safeguard and protect them’ (Int.21/PO/Site A). This officer then 
went on to explain that through this process the public are also made ‘aware [of the 
requirements imposed and] are able to notify the police that they [were] breached’ 
(Int.21/PO/Site A). 
In Site B, five out of the ten participants mentioned that certain pieces of 
information were only shared with those affected or likely to have been affected by the 
perpetrator’s behaviour. As one local practitioner explained:  
We will always consider to who we are telling about this … so we told the 
estate what has actually been done because we obviously believed that 
everyone would have been affected because of the nature of the behaviour 
and because of where the behaviour was happening (Int.16/LP/Site B).  
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As one interviewee noted, to publicise information to people who have not been affected 
by the perpetrator’s behaviour ‘would be a disproportionate’ response (Int.17/PO/Site B). 
Again, it was clear that the sharing of information was ‘case specific’ (Int.8/LP/Site B). 
A risk-assessment was carried out in advance taking into consideration the impact of the 
perpetrators’ behaviour and any personal issues they might be facing, such as mental 
health issues (Int.8/LP/Site B). One interviewee noted that in order for them to publicise 
the issue of an injunction the behaviour in question must have had a ‘community impact’ 
(Int.8/LP/Site B). They stated, however, that their aim was to ‘inform [the public] rather 
than to identify’ the perpetrators (Int.8/LP/Site B). 
As far as the remaining five participants are concerned, there was an impression 
that ‘the public at large need to be advised … because clearly that person has not changed 
from all the efforts you have put in beforehand’ (Int.22/LP/Site B). The following 
statement is illustrative of this approach: 
It is incredibly difficult to prove that somebody has breached the sanctions 
that they have been placed upon them without the community taking 
ownership. It was never a particular popular concept across the country. 
You know the old ‘name it and shame it’ ... Did it breach their human 
rights? My personal opinion is that the rights of the victims should be held 
at a higher level than the rights of the perpetrator (Int.9/LP/Site B). 
The above testimony is not to suggest that in Site B ‘name and shame’ practices were 
used. Rather, it is to illustrate that half of the participants from Site B were in favour of a 
broader approach in terms of how information about the perpetrator and their behaviour 
should be managed. Indeed, these participants emphasised that these measures can hardly 
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be monitored. As one police officer pointed out ‘unfortunately, there are not enough of 
us to police every single injunction or criminal behaviour order. So, we rely upon whoever 
sees or if the victim sees to come forward with the details of the breaches’ (Int.13/PO/Site 
B).  
Based on the data collected, the proportion of local enforcement agents from Site 
B who were in favour of wider publicity was higher than Site A where the vast majority 
of the participants advocated for a more measured approached. Nonetheless, evidence 
from both sites suggests that in most cases information about the perpetrators was only 
shared with those directly affected by their behaviour as a means of facilitating the 
effective policing of the requirements imposed rather than as a means of publically 
condemning those who behaved in an anti-social manner. The importance of this finding 
lies in the potential impact that ‘name and shame’ practices can have on those subjected 
to these measures. These practices cannot only result in the stigmatisation and social 
ostracisation of certain individuals, but in a ‘risk obsessed’ society it can also be utilised 
to legitimise, by increasing the level of insecurity among society, more punitive methods 
of regulation in the absence of compelling evidence.93 In the context of ASB, this might 
result in the extensive use of the injunction pre-emptively and the imposition of 
disproportionate restrictions on the liberty of those subjected to this measure. This does 
not only highlight further the welfare – crime management tension that lies at the heart of 
practice, but it also demonstrates the need for robust procedures at a local level through 
which it can be ensured that the injunction remains a preventative rather than a punitive 
measure.  
 
93 P O’Malley, above n 46, p 7; P Gray, ‘The political economy of risk and the new governance of youth 





At first sight, the repeal and replacement of the ASBO by a purely civil injunction appears 
to mitigate against some of the concerns raised about its hybrid nature. For Brown, this 
shift towards what appears to be a less punitive approach to ASB is part of the Coalition 
Government’s efforts to re-brand the new ASB regime in an attempt to ‘change the 
[negative] narrative associated with the ASBO’.94 As part of this re-branding effort, the 
Coalition Government promised a more victim-oriented approach whilst providing local 
enforcement agents with the necessary flexibility needed to deal with ASB swiftly and 
effectively.95 Still though this shift towards a purely civil injunction should be approached 
with caution. The reason for this is twofold. First, the implementation of the injunction 
might not be subjected to the same level of judicial and academic scrutiny due to its civil 
nature. This is further evidenced by the Government’s decision not to collect data 
regarding the number of applications submitted for the issue of an injunction to courts. 
The importance of this omission is heightened by: i) the data published by the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales which found that almost 37% of the adult population has 
experienced some kind of ASB in the year ending in December 2018; ii) and the fact that 
the implementation of the injunction can still operate as a de facto criminal measure, 
despite this shift towards a purely civil response.96 
Second, notwithstanding the 2014 amendments, it was evident from the data 
collected that in both sites the regulation of ASB takes place primarily in the ‘shadows’ 
 
94 K Brown, above n 2, 92. 
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with local enforcement agents still relying heavily on various informal interventions 
before applying to court for the issue of an injunction.  
Notwithstanding the concerns raised about the potential misuse of the injunction, 
it was evident from the data collected during this study that in both sites under 
investigation, the implementation of the injunction was informed by the principles of 
necessity and proportionality. That said, the findings of this study should be approached 
with caution since they do not necessarily represent how the ASB tools and powers are 
implemented across England and Wales. The 2014 Act provides local enforcement agents 
with a considerable magnitude of discretion both in terms of the scope of the law, i.e. how 
ASB is to be conceptualised, and its implementation.97 Moreover, it should be borne in 
mind that this study examined the implementation of the injunction from a practitioner’s 
perspective. Those against whom the ASB measures were used might feel that the 
requirements imposed on them were grossly disproportionated and that they amounted to 
a form of punishment in their own right.  
Despite the limitations of this study, its findings can be further analysed in order 
to identify those factors that contributed to the adoption of a more welfarist as opposed to 
enforcement-led approach while mitigating against some of the concerns raised about the 
potential misuse of the injunction. It is argued that these factors can inform existing ASB 
policies as a means of preventing the injunction from operating as de facto criminal 
measure while securing a more consistent implementation of the law across England and 
Wales.  
 
97 S Demetriou, above n 21, 352-353. 
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Analysis of the data collected reveals three main factors that can contribute to this 
end. First, it was evident upon closer scrutiny of the data collected from both sites that in 
most of the participating institutions there were both internal and external review 
procedures in place. As to the former, most of the interviewees pointed out that ‘it is not 
just one officer on their own’ who decides whether someone’s behaviour is anti-social 
and whether they should apply for the issue of an injunction (Int.12/PO/Site B). The 
procedure followed by local enforcement agents was largely determined by the outcome 
of the risk assessment carried out after a potential incident of ASB was reported to them. 
After the initial assessment was conducted by the ‘call taker’, the case was then assigned 
to an ASB officer who would review this incident further (Int.21/PO/Site A). It was clear 
that there were a number of review layers throughout this process in order to make sure 
that the implementation of the injunction adhered to the guidelines issued by ‘people in 
high command’ (Int.15/PO/Site A). 
Reference was also made by most interviewees to the local multi-agency meetings 
held on a regular basis. It was evident in the data that these multi-agency meetings enabled 
local enforcement agents to combine their knowledge and expertise leading to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the perpetrators’ behaviour and needs. It is worth 
mentioning that this multi-agency and multi-disciplinary approach was not limited to 
information-sharing agreements, but it also included a close collaboration between the 
various institutions and collective decision taking.  
The presence of these internal and external review procedures was also promoting 
professional accountability. Moreover, the presence of these review procedures can result 
in the more consistent implementation of the law at a local level. Conducting a risk 
assessment, for instance, allows local enforcement agents to better assess the level of risk 
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posed by the perpetrators.98 As rightly pointed out by Donoghue though, ‘divergence in 
the organisational cultures, practices and experiences of [the relevant] agencies means 
that ASB is identified and categorised inconsistently’ even within the same area.99 Robust 
external review procedures can partly compensate for these divergences leading to a more 
structured and coherent approach at a local level while constraining an otherwise 
expansive legal framework.  
Another important factor that prevented the adoption of a purely enforcement-led 
approach was the fact that most of the interviewees acknowledged that on many occasions 
ASB involves complex situational and contextual causal variables. As many research 
participants pointed out, some of the main causes of ASB included alcohol problems, 
drug misuse and other socio-economic issues which created a vicious circle of ASB and 
criminality. This led them to the realisation that a purely enforcement-driven approach is 
not always the answer to ASB. Instead, most of them believed that the administration of 
ASB should be complemented by an attempt to address the underlying causes of this 
behaviour. Central to this realisation was the need to work with the perpetrators in order 
to divert them away from ASB and criminality. Consequently, there was a shift towards 
a more welfarist approach as a means of providing the perpetrators with the necessary 
support needed in order to tackle what really causes them to behave in an anti-social 
manner. This also enabled local enforcement agents to address (at least to some extent) 
the tension between welfarism and crime management that lies at the heart of practice. 
Finally, another decisive factor that contributed towards the adoption of a more 
welfarist approach to ASB was the fact that many local enforcement agents planned their 
 
98 J Donoghue, ‘Reflections on risk, anti-social behaviour and vulnerable/repeat victims’ (2013) 53 British 
Journal of Criminology 814. 
99 Ibid, 815. 
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strategies whilst contemplating what the potential implications of their actions on the 
perpetrator would be. As the following testimony illustrates, before applying to the court 
for the issue of an injunction, local enforcement agents tried to design the proposed 
requirements in a manner that would not pose barriers to the perpetrator’s needs: ‘It has 
to be specifically related to their offending behaviour. You know you cannot just say 
“You cannot go to retail shops because you are a shoplifter”. That person is going to say: 
“How am I supposed to buy my shopping?”’ (Int.26/PO/Site A). This need to consider 
what the potential implications of their decisions on the perpetrator could be, was also 
particularly prevalent when deciding the level of publicity required for each case.  
By contemplating the potential implications of their decisions and by 
acknowledging the need to address the underlying causes of ASB, local enforcement 
agents were able to move away from a censure-based approach towards a more welfare-
driven strategy. This led to the realisation that a purely censure-based approach which 
fails to engage with these problems is likely to result in a vicious circle of ASB and 
criminality which will inevitably stigmatise perpetrators further and possibly lead to their 
social ostracisation.100  
 
100 P Squires and D Stephen, above n 89, 523. 
